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I. INTRODUCTION

When a tax advisor renders incorrect advice due to negligence and
a plaintiff establishes all the requisite elements of a malpractice cause of
action, the most frequently encountered direct damages consist of four
elements: additional taxes caused by the negligence, interest on
underpaid taxes, penalties, and corrective costs incurred in attempting to
eliminate or mitigate all or some of the foregoing damages.' This article
will focus on the recoverability of interest incurred by a plaintiff on a tax
underpayment caused by the tax advisor's negligence. Such interest
payment is present in many, if not most, tax malpractice situations
because both federal 2 and state 3 laws impose an interest charge on the
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the
very able research assistance of Matthew Bates, class of 2010. 0 2011 Jacob L. Todres.
1. See generally Jacob L. Todres, Tax MalpracticeDamages: A Comprehensive Review of
the Elements and the Issues, 61 Tax Law. 705, 712 (2008) [hereinafter Tax MalpracticeDamages].
It should be noted that additional consequential damages are also recoverable in appropriate
circumstances. Id. at 736 et. seq.
2. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6621(a)(2) (2006) and I.R.C. § 6622(a) (2006).
3. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 19101 (West 2001): N.Y. TAX LAw § 684; NY CLS
Tax § 684 (2010); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.01 (Vernon 2009).
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underpayment of a tax liability. While other types of interest payments
incurred by a plaintiff may also be recoverable as consequential
damages, such other interest payments will not be addressed in this
article.
There are several reasons why I wish to focus on this area. First,
and foremost, to update the analysis I presented in a recent article5 in
light of new developments, especially in light of Frank v. Lockwood,
which finally got the issues right and in which the majority and the
dissent disagree about appropriate matters. The second reason I will
revisit this area is that certain courts appear not to appreciate the
seriousness of the issues involved, and/or the existence of divergent
views.7 Instead, these courts simply assume the question of the
recoverability of such interest is a routine matter to be dealt with
summarily.8 Finally, other courts inexplicably persist in perpetuating
erroneous statements about this area of law. 9

4. An example of such other types of interest is where a plaintiff incurs avoidable taxes due
to a tax advisor's negligence and pays such taxes with borrowed funds thus incurring interest on
such borrowing. Wynn v. Estate of Holmes, 1991 OK CIV APP 78,
31-34, 815 P.2d 1231, 123536, overruled on another issue, Stroud v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 2001 OK 76, 37 P.3d 783.
Similarly, if a tax advisor's negligence prevents a plaintiff from obtaining low-cost, tax exempt
financing, thereby forcing the plaintiff to incur higher, conventional market rate financing, the
additional interest incurred might be recoverable. Billings Clinic v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 797
P.2d 899, 913 (Mont. 1990).
5. Tax MalpracticeDamages, supra note 1, at 723.
6. 749 N.W.2d 443 (Neb. 2008).
7. See, e.g., Amato v. KPMG LLP, No. 06cv39, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57091 (M.D. Pa.
Aug. 14, 2006) in which the court granted the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of an earlier
motion in which the issue of the recoverability of such interest was entirely dealt with in two
footnotes. The court acknowledged,
[a] thorough review of our . . . [earlier order], submissions made by the parties, and
applicable case law reveal that we glossed over what should have been a significant
inquiry concerning the recoverability of interest as a proper measure of damages to
Plaintiffs' claims. It is entirely appropriate for us to take this opportunity to
comprehensively address the circuit split concerning this issue and to reconsider our
prior erroneous determination that plaintiffs' claims for the recoupment of interest paid
to the IRS ought to be dismissed at the pleadings stage ....
Id. at *8.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Malone v. Clark Nuber, P.S., No. C007-2046RSL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48461
at *50 (W.D. Wash. June 23, 2008) in which the court's entire discussion of the recoverability of
interest is the following: "similarly, Washington follows 'the majority of jurisdictions holding that
interest owed to the IRS is not recoverable' from defendants." Id. (quoting Leendertsen v. Price
Waterhouse, 916 P.2d 449 (Wash. App. 1996)). The only problems with this sentence are first, that
in 2008 it is very clear that the no interest recovery view is not the majority view but very distinctly
a minority view. See Tax Malpractice Damages, supra note 1, at 723 n.109. In addition, the view
was also the minority view in 1996 when Leendertsen was decided. See Caroline Rule, What and
When Can a Taxpayer Recover from a Negligent Tax Advisor?, 92 J. Tax'n 176, 177-78 (2000),
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In my view, this area is relatively straightforward. There are three
views that have developed. Once the views are apprehended, it should
be relatively easy for a court to choose which view to follow. By
presenting and analyzing the three views, this area will be appropriately
elucidated and subsequently given the thoughtful attention it warrants.
In Part II, I will focus upon each of the three views and explore the
rationale for each view. In Part III, I will trace the development of each
of the views, especially the minority view and more modem,
intermediate view. The goal of this discussion is to arrive at a tally of
the jurisdictions following each view, remaining fully cognizant that
such tallies are, at best, subject to dispute and also quite transient. My
reflections on each of the three views and their approaches will be
presented in Part IV. My conclusion is that the minority view, while
having made an important contribution to the development of the law in
this area, should give way to the modem, intermediate view and that the
few states that continue to follow it should change and adopt the modem
view. A brief conclusion will follow in Part V.
II. RECOVERABILITY OF INTEREST ON A TAx UNDERPAYMENT-THREE
VIEWS'o

Three views have developed with respect to the recoverability of
interest on a tax underpayment. According to the more established
traditional view that is the majority view," such interest is recoverable
from a defendant just like any other damages proximately caused.12 A
who, in an article published in March 2000 listed four states in the no interest recovery view and
fourteen states allowing interest recovery. Most of the authorities cited for the fourteen majority
view states predated Leendertsen, which was decided in 1996. See infra Part III, in which I present
a current tally of states following each of the three views.
10. This portion of the article is primarily adapted from Tax MalpracticeDamages, supra
note 1, 723-31.
11. Part III of this article will focus on how many states follow each approach.
12. See, e.g., Jobe v. Int'l Ins. Co., 933 F. Supp. 844, 860 (D. Ariz. 1995) orderwithdrawn
pursuant to settlement, I F. Supp. 2d 1403 (D. Ariz. 1997); Jones v. Childers, No. 88-85-CIV-T22C, 1992 WL 300845, at *12 (M.D. Fla. June 26, 1992), afd and rev'd on other grounds,18 F.3d
899 (11th Cir. 1994); Wynn v. Estate of Holmes, 1991 OK CIV APP 78, 134, 815 P.2d 1231, 1236,
overruled on another issue by Stroud v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 2001 OK 76, 37 P.3d 783; Jerry
Clark Equip., Inc. v. Hibbits, 612 N.E.2d 858, 861-63, 865 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Dail v. Adamson,
570 N.E.2d 1167, 1169 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Sorenson v. Fio Rito, 413 N.E.2d 47, 51, 53, 55 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1980); Cameron v. Montgomery, 225 N.W.2d 154, 155-56 (Iowa 1975); Slaughter v.
Roddie, 249 So. 2d 584, 586 (La. Ct. App. 1971); Warmbrodt v. Blanchard, 692 P.2d 1282, 1284
n.2 (Nev. 1984); Hall v. Gill, 670 N.E.2d 503, 506 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); Wyatt v. Smith, Nos. 92
CA 104, 91 CV 400, 1993 WL 518630 at *1, *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 15, 1993); Harrell v. Crystal,
611 N.E.2d 908, 913-14 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); King v. Neal, 2001 OK CIV APP 11, IN 1-13, 19
P.3d 899, 900-02; Merriam v. Cont'l Cas. Co., No. 98-2522-FT, 597 N.W.2d 774, 1999 WL 326183
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second view, that is the minority view, is diametrically opposite to the
first view and absolutely prohibits the recovery of such interest.' 3 This
view developed from approximately 1986 to 1996.14 A third view, a
middle view followed in a number of states, permits the recovery of such
interest, but only to the extent it exceeds the interest actually earned by
the plaintiff on the underpaid taxes.' 5 This last view initially started in
1999 and seems to be the preferred view of most recent cases.
The starting point in this inquiry is the traditional view that since
the defendant's negligence caused the plaintiff to incur the interest
expense, the interest is recoverable under the normal theory of damages
for negligence, which is to make the plaintiff whole.' 7 Thus, many cases
simply include the interest as an element of recoverable damages.'
The basic reason for the opposite view denying recovery of the
interest is that to permit a recovery would result in a windfall for the
plaintiff.'9 The plaintiff would have both the use of the tax money as
well as a recovery of the interest paid for the use of that money.20
According to this view, the interest charged for a tax underpayment is
not a penalty imposed upon the taxpayer. 2 1 Rather, it is merely a charge
for the use of money that really belonged to the government rather than
the plaintiff.22 To put it differently, allowing the plaintiff both use of the
tax money and a recovery of the interest from the defendant results in an
interest-free loan to the plaintiff "for the period during which the tax[es]
were unpaid." 2 3 This view follows the approach of federal securities law
at *4-5 (Wis. Ct. App. May 25, 1999) (table opinion); Adel v. Parkhurst, 681 P.2d 886, 890 (Wyo.
1984). See also McCulloch v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 971 P.2d 414, 415 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
13. See, e.g., Eckert Cold Storage, Inc. v. Behl, 943 F. Supp. 1230, 1235 (E.D. Calif. 1996);
Orsini v. Bratten, 713 P.2d 791, 794 (Alaska 1996); Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 559
N.Y.S.2d 312, 315 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); Leendertsen, 916 P.2d at 451.
14. See supra note 13.
15. See, e.g., Streber v. Hunter, 221 F.3d 701, 734-35 (5th Cir. 2000); Frank v. Lockwood,
749 N.W.2d 443 (Neb. 2008); Ronson v. Talesnick, 33 F. Supp. 2d 347, 353-54 (D.N.J. 1999);
O'Bryan v. Ashland, 2006 SD 56, 1 20, 717 N.W.2d 632, 638-39; Amato v. KPMG LLP, No.
06cv39, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57091 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2006).
16. See infra Part III.
17. See, e.g., Jobe, 933 F. Supp. at 860; Jerry Clark Equip., Inc., 612 N.E.2d at 863, 865;
Dail, 570 N.E.2d at 1169; Harrell, 611 N.E.2d at 913-14; King, 2001 OK CIV APP 11, 1 13, 19
P.3d at 902; Merriam, 597 N.W.2d 774, 1999 WL 326183, at *2.
18. See supranote 17.
19. See cases cited supra note 13.
20. See cases cited supra note 13.
21. See, e.g., O'Bryan,2006 SD 56, 1113-15, 717 N.W.2d 632, 636-37.
22. Id.
23. Caroline Rule, What and When Can a Taxpayer Recoverfrom a Negligent Tax Advisor?,
92 J. Tax'n 176, 177 (2000) (citing the reasoning used by jurisdictions in Alaska, California, New
York, and Washington).
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for securities fraud claims under Rule 1Ob-5, under which such interest
also is not recoverable.24
Leendertsen v. Price Waterhouse, which adopted the no-interestrecovery view in Washington State, suggested two additional
justifications for this result.25 First, a defendant may not be held
responsible for such damages because there is no proximate causation;
the rate of return earned by a plaintiff on such funds is due to the
plaintiff's exercise of independent "judgment as to where to invest the
money." 26 The court seemed to be concerned that "damages from poor
investing are too speculative to blame [on] defendants." 27 Also, the
court was concerned with the "difficulty of proving where the money
was invested." 2 8
In McCulloch v. Price Waterhouse LLP., the Court of Appeals of
Oregon gave short shrift to these concerns. 29 Here too, the court, as a
matter of first impression, was faced with the decision of whether
interest paid on a tax underpayment is recoverable as damages.3 0 In
deciding, contrary to Leendertsen, that such interest is recoverable, the
court simply held that similar issues were dealt with satisfactorily under
Oregon law either by the jury where enough evidence to get to a jury
was introduced by the plaintiff or by the court directing a verdict in
cases where there was inadequate evidence to get to a jury.3 ' In other
words, such issues were properly to be determined by the trier of fact.32
The third view is a modern, intermediate view between the previous
two extremes that was developed in Ronson v. Talesnick3 3 and Streber v.
Hunter.34 It seems to be a reaction primarily to the harsh results that
may occur from a rigid application of the no-interest-recovery view.
The logic of the no-interest-recovery view initially seems compelling
because when a plaintiff obtains and keeps money she or he is not

24. See, e.g., Streber v. Hunter, 221 F.3d 701, 734 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing DCD Programs, Ltd.
v. Leighton, 90 F.3d 1442, 1449 (9th Cir. 1996)); Stone v. Kirk, 8 F.3d 1079, 1092-93 (6th Cir.
1993); Freschi v. Grand Coal Venture, 767 F.2d 1041, 1051 (2d Cir. 1985), vacated on other
grounds, 478 U.S. 1015 (1986). Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, relied on Freschi in
denying recovery of such interest. 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 315 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
25. 916 P.2d 449, 451-52 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
26. Id. at 451.
27. Id at 452.
28. Id.
29. 971 P.2d 414, 419 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
30. Id. at 417.
31. Id. at 419.
32. Id
33. 33 F. Supp. 2d 347, 353-54 (D. N.J. 1999).
34. 221 F.3d 701, 734-35 (5th Cir. 2000).
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entitled to, it seems appropriate to impose an interest charge for the use
of this money when the money is repaid. If this interest charge were
recoverable from the defendant, logic further suggests the plaintiff
would enjoy a windfall of having enjoyed the interest-free use of the
money.35 However, simply denying any recovery of such interest is
based on the tacit assumption that the theoretical value of the use of the
money is always exactly equal to the interest paid to the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS") or a state and that these amounts always net
out, leaving no net recoverable damages. However, there are several
practical problems with this theoretical scenario. As an initial matter, it
assumes the plaintiff taxpayer has available money to invest equal to the
tax underpayment, the earnings on which offset the interest charged for
the underpayment. Frequently, however, a plaintiff will not have any
available funds to invest so there are no earnings to offset the interest
payable to the IRS. 6 Additionally, the theoretical scenario assumes the
taxpayer can earn a rate of return on his or her investable funds equal to
the interest charged by the IRS, which often may not be true. Finally,
the no-interest-recovery approach does not take into account the
hardship to a plaintiff who has to make an unexpected payment, which
may not have been budgeted.37
In Ronson, the plaintiff taxpayer invested in tax shelter partnerships
from 1980 through 1983 and claimed losses from the partnerships on his
tax returns. Subsequently, the IRS began questioning the deductibility
of these losses." In mid-1986, the taxpayer sought advice from the
defendant accountant on how to stop the accrual of interest on the
amount that would be owed if these losses were ultimately disallowed.4 0
The accountant advised the taxpayer to send the IRS a cash bond for
$91,300, which the taxpayer did in June 1986.41 In 1996, the IRS
audited the taxpayer and determined the cash bond was too low and that

35. Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
36. See, e.g., Wynn v. Estate of Holmes, 1991 OK CIV APP 78, 29, 815 P.2d 1231, 1235
overruled on another issue by Stroud v. Arthur Anderson, 2001 OK 76, 37 P.3d 783. As a
theoretical matter, even if the plaintiff does not have financial liquidity and does not have available
an amount of funds to invest, the financial benefit of having had the government's funds still has
occurred. In the absence of the tax underpayment, the plaintiff may have had to either do without
certain expenditures or borrow a similar amount to meet his or her needs, thereby benefiting by the
amount of interest not incurred.
37. See Rule, supranote 23, at 177.
38. 33 F. Supp. at 349-50.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 350.
41. Id.
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interest of approximately $235,000 was still due.4 2 The taxpayer then
filed suit, seeking recovery from the accountant of the additional interest
owed by the taxpayer.43
The only damages sought by the plaintiff in Ronson was the interest
owed the IRS." The defendant moved for summary judgment on the
ground that interest is never recoverable as damages and that the suit
therefore must be dismissed since an essential element of the cause of
action (i.e., damages) was absent.4 5 The federal district court determined
that New Jersey law applied and that New Jersey had no law on point."
Therefore, the court had to determine how the New Jersey Supreme
Court would rule on this issue.47
In deciding the issue, the court in Ronson initially recognized the
split between the no-interest-recovery and the interest-recovery views.48
Based on New Jersey's public policy that a tortfeasor should not benefit
from the ingenuity of a harmed plaintiff, the court decided that New
Jersey would permit the recovery of interest. 49 According to the court,
prohibiting the recovery of interest from a negligent accountant permits
the tortfeasor to benefit from the presumption that a harmed taxpayer has
been or should have been ingenious enough to (1) maintain a sum of
money that he would have otherwise had to pay over to the IRS and (2)
invest that money in a manner in which he earned interest in an amount
comparable to the interest rate charged by the IRS.so
Ronson, however, did not hold that New Jersey simply would adopt
the view allowing recovery of the interest.s" Ronson held that New
Jersey law is more circumscribed.52 It found that New Jersey follows a
benefits rule that 'where a wrong creates a benefit that would not have
existed but for the wrong, the damages flowing from the wrong are
offset to the extent of the benefit received."' 53
Under this rule, a defendant could introduce "evidence of [a]
benefit from the malpractice that could . . . reduce a plaintiffs

42. Id.
43. Id. at351.
44. Id.
45. Id
46. Id. at 351-52.
47. Id at 352.
48. Id
49. Id. at 355 (surmising that this was the New Jersey public policy underlying its collateral
source rule).
5 0. Id.
51. Idat354.
52. Id
53. Id. (quoting Garcia v. Meiselman, 531 A.2d 1373, 1377 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987).
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recovery., 54 Thus, where a plaintiff earned some interest on the tax
underpayment, but less than the amount paid to the IRS, the interest
recovery would be limited to the difference.ss
In Streber, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a damage award of exactly the
same amount, which the court referred to as the "interest differential,"
that is, the difference between the interest earned by the plaintiff while
she had the tax underpayment and the interest charged by the IRS.56
Streber involved a combination of bad advice by the defendant attorney
about how to report a transaction for tax purposes as well as subsequent
bad advice not to settle the controversy on favorable terms.s" At the jury
trial below, the most significant element of damages awarded was for the
On appeal, the defendants argued that such
interest differential.
interest was not recoverable. 59
At the commencement of its analysis, the Fifth Circuit noted that
the issue was one of first impression in that court as well as in any other
court.6 0 The court recognized the split between the no-interest-recovery
and the interest-recovery views 6 ' and also recognized that no interest
recovery was permitted for federal securities fraud claims under Rule
1Ob-5. 62 The Fifth Circuit then held that the interest differential was
recoverable because by awarding only the interest differential there was
no double recovery as would occur if a plaintiff could recover all the
interest paid to the IRS.63 Additionally, an award of the interest

54. Id. at 355.
55. Id.
56. 221 F.3d 701, 734 (5th Cir. 2000).
57. Id. at 713-16.
58. Id. at 717.
59. Id. at 734.
60. Id Strangely, the court cited the Ronson case at the end of the very paragraph in which it
made this statement, apparently without realizing that Ronson had addressed the same issue. Id.
See also Ronson, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 351, 354-55. The Fifth Circuit simply cited Ronson as one of the
accountant malpractice cases allowing the recovery of interest. Perhaps the Fifth Circuit intended
its observation to be directed at attorney tax malpractice rather than accountant tax malpractice.
However, Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey which was cited by the court as one of the
accountant malpractice cases involved attorneys as defendants. See 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 313 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1990). Jobe v. International Insurance Co. similarly involved tax malpractice by an
attorney though the case was brought by an insured law firm against its malpractice insurer. See
933 F. Supp. 844, 849 (D. Ariz. 1995), orderwithdrawn pursuant to settlement, 1 F. Supp. 2d 1403
(D. Ariz. 1997).
61. Streber, 221 F.3d at 734. The Fifth Circuit referred to this split as involving accounting
malpractice claims, though two of the five cases cited by the court involved attorneys (Alpert and
Jobe). Jobe involved a suit between an insured law firm and its malpractice insurer. 933 F. Supp. at
849; see also Alpert, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
62. Streber, 221 F.3d at 734.
63. Id. at 734-35.
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differential would prevent a plaintiff from being penalized for
conservative investing.6 The Fifth Circuit held that the result was
correct under the applicable Texas law, which required damages
adequate to make a plaintiff whole.65 Likewise, the Texas law's
requirements that consequential damages be "foreseeable" and proven
with "reasonable certainty" were complied with because the evidence
established that the defendant knew the plaintiffs intended to invest
conservatively." In addition, there was abundant evidence establishing
exactly how much the plaintiffs earned from the tax underpayment and
how much interest the IRS charged.
While Streber seemed to uphold an award of exactly the same
amount as contemplated in Ronson,6 8 there is a very important
procedural difference between the two approaches. In Ronson, the court
awarded the plaintiff the full interest paid to the IRS, subject to the
defendant being able to prove the existence of a benefit (i.e., earnings)
received by the plaintiff that should reduce the plaintiffs recovery.6 9 In
Streber, on the other hand, the plaintiffs had the burden of proving the
interest differential with "reasonable certainty." 70
In O'Bryan v. Ashland, the Supreme Court of South Dakota was
called upon to decide the issue of whether interest on a tax
underpayment was recoverable. 7 ' Here, the case involved an error by
the defendant accountant concerning the incorporation of plaintiffs
business and the change from the cash method of accounting to the
accrual method of accounting.72 The accountant's error resulted in a
substantial underpayment of tax that the IRS later discovered and for
which the IRS imposed an interest charge on the plaintiff.73 At trial, the
defendant accountant conceded his negligence and the only issue was the
amount of damages recoverable. 74 Both parties argued extensively
before the jury as to whether interest was recoverable, and the jury
ultimately awarded the plaintiff the interest charged by the IRS, which
64. Id.
65. Id. at 735.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 740; Ronson v. Talesnick, 33 F. Supp. 2d 347, 355 (D. N.J. 1999).
69. 33 F. Supp. 2d at 355.
70. 221 F.3d at 735.
71. 2006 SD 56, 1 12, 717 N.W.2d 632, 636.
72. Id. 1, 717 N.W.2d at 633-34. For a very brief overview of tax accounting methods, see
JOHN E. DAVIDIAN & JACOB L. TODRES, REDUCING PERSONAL INCOME TAXES: A GUIDE TO
DEDUCTIONS AND CREDITS § 1.06 (Law Journal Seminars Press 1998).
73. 2006 SD 56, 14, 717 N.W.2d at 634.
74. Id. 16, 717 N.W.2d at 635.
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was calculated to be around $39,000.71 On appeal, the issue was
whether such interest may be recovered as damages under South Dakota
law.
After recognizing the existing split between the no-interestrecovery and interest-recovery views and examining each view, the
South Dakota Supreme Court placed itself firmly with those states that
refuse to adopt a blanket no-interest-recovery rule.n The court did this
in conformity with its own precedent requiring the injured party be made
whole.
After concluding that such interest may be recoverable, the
court affirmed the jury award of interest as being supported by the
evidence. 79 The court then went on to seemingly endorse the approach
taken by Ronson to allow a defendant to come forward with evidence of
a benefit received by the plaintiff from the malpractice that would
reduce the plaintiffs recovery.80 According to the court, such an
approach would "cut a pragmatic course between two rigid theories."
However, the court stopped short of adopting the Ronson approach and
left that for a future case.82
What is notably absent from O'Bryan's analysis is any discussion
of, or even reference to, the Streber case, which essentially follows
Ronson and, together with Ronson, seems to anchor the intermediate
view on this issue.
In Amato v. KPMG LLP., the federal district court in Pennsylvania
followed O'Bryan, after agreeing that it "provides an excellent template
for surveying the legal debate about recovery of interest paid to the
IRS."8 In Amato, the federal district court was applying Pennsylvania

75. Id. 9, 717 N.W.2d at 636.
76. Id. 10, 717 N.W.2d at 636.
77. Id 21, 717 N.W.2d at 639.
78. Id., 717 N.W.2d at 639 (quoting Hulstein v. Meilman Food Indus., Inc., 293 N.W.2d 889,
891 (S.D. 1980)).
79. Id at 123, 717 N.W.2d at 639-40.
80. Id at 24, 717 N.W.2d at 639-40.
81. Id.,717N.W.2dat640.
82. Id., 717 N.W.2d at 640.
83. Amato v. KPMG LLP, No. 06cv39, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57091, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Aug.
14, 2006). The procedural posture of Amato is fascinating. At the heart of the case is a claim by the
plaintiffs that the defendants put them in an ineffective tax shelter prevalent in the late 1990s to
early 2000s. The complaint was filed in Pennsylvania court on October 28, 2005. It was removed
to the federal district court on January 6, 2006. On June 13, 2006, the court issued an order
addressing a number of different motions made by the parties. Without really focusing on the issues
surrounding the recoverability of interest, the court granted one of the defendant's motions which
resulted in precluding the plaintiffs from recovering any interest paid to the IRS. Id. at *1. The
O'Bryan case was issued on June 21, 2006. Id. at *4-5. The present motion for reconsideration of
the preclusion of any interest recovery was filed on June 27, 2006. Id. at *1.
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law. After noting that Pennsylvania had no law on point and after
analyzing the split in authority, the court held
The better practice is to reject a blanket rule forbidding interest
recovery in professional malpractice actions. Instead, we align
ourselves with those jurisdictions that leave the issue as to whether a
taxpayer has been damaged to the trier of fact, with the burden of proof
upon the taxpayer. Therefore, we conclude that interest paid to the
IRS may be a recoverable element of damages, depending upon the
facts of the case.
Frank v. Lockwood85 is the most recent case to focus on the
recoverability of interest on a tax underpayment. While firmly placing
itself within the newer, third view, the case contains extensive analysis
of the relevant issues.
This is probably due to the fact that the
procedural difference noted above between the Ronson approach and
Streber's interest differential approach 8 7 is exactly the bone of
contention between the majority and the dissent.
In Frank, the ultimate issue before the Supreme Court of Nebraska
was the recoverability of federal and Nebraska interest and penalties
incurred by the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Frank, on the late payment of
their taxes and the late filing of their tax returns for 2001.8 There was
evidence that their accountant, defendant Fred Lockwood, failed to
advise them to pay estimated taxes for 2001 when, on April 15, 2002, he
advised them to file for an extension of time to file their 2001 federal
and Nebraska income tax returns.89 After trial, the jury awarded the
plaintiffs the full amount of interest and penalties paid to the IRS and
Nebraska. 90 The trial judge denied several motions by the defendant for
a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.9i On
appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court of Nebraska was whether the
defendant suffered recoverable damages.9 2
With respect to the recoverability of interest incurred by the
plaintiffs on the late payment of their taxes, the Supreme Court of
Nebraska stated several times that it rejected a blanket rule that

84. Id. at *6.
85. 749 N.W.2d 443 (Neb. 2008).
86. Id. at 451-53.
87.

See supratext accompanying notes 69-70.

88. 749 N.W.2d at 451.
89. Id. at 448.
90. Id. at 44849.

91. Id
92. Id. at 451.
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precluded the recoverability of interest on taxes as an item of damages.93
It also stated the converse proposition several times, that it was adopting
a rule that such interest is available as an item of damages.94 However,
the court made it very clear that the burden of proof was on a plaintiff to
Because the
specifically establish the existence of such damages.
plaintiffs in Frank did not satisfy this burden of proof, interest was not
recoverable.
The burden of proof placed upon plaintiffs by the court seems to be
a very heavy one. The court, though ultimately not adopting the
minority, no-interest-recovery view, seemed in basic agreement with this
view's approach:
As noted above, we generally agree with the reasoning of other courts
that interest paid to the IRS represents a payment for use of money and
that therefore, a person who has use of the money is not generally
damaged by the payment of interest. We recognize that there may be
circumstances under which a plaintiff actually is damaged, but the
burden remains on the plaintiff to prove that such circumstances exist.
. . . "[T]o the extent that the I.R.S. charges the market rate, interest is
not a proper element of damages" . . . . To the extent that interest

charged by the IRS is above the market rate or does not reflect the
value of the use of the money, we think it is the plaintiffs duty to so
97
prove ....
Previously, the court indicated that a plaintiff might incur damages
from the payment of such interest if he or she could show either that he
or she could have borrowed money at the relevant time at a rate below
that imposed by the taxing authorities, or if he or she had enough money
to pay the taxes but the value of the use of such money during the
relevant period was less than the interest rate charged by the taxing
authorities.
Though the court never explained the second situation,
presumably, it would exist where a plaintiff could not earn as high a rate
of return on his funds as the interest charged by the taxing authorities. 99
The approach of the majority in Frankwas to create a presumption
that normally the payment of interest does not represent damages and

93. Id. at 451-53.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 453-54, 456.
97. Id. at 453 (internal citation omitted).
98. Id. at 452.
99. See the court's discussion of the interest differential approach where it seems to
acknowledge that an interest differential, if proven, might be recoverable. Id. at 453-54.
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that a plaintiff has the burden of proving the contrary.'0 0 The dissent,
which disagreed only with the majority's approach to the recovery of
interest issue, disagreed with this presumption.o'0
The dissent's
approach is the diametrical opposite of the majority's. In the dissent's
view, the plaintiffs would not have incurred any interest payment but for
the defendant's negligence. 102 As such, the dissent's position is that the
recovery of the interest payment does not place the plaintiffs in a better
position.103 The dissent then concedes that the harm caused by the
defendant's negligence might be offset by the benefit of plaintiffs'
having had use of the money, but that the burden of proving this "special
benefit" belongs on the defendant.'"
The disagreement between the majority and the dissent seems to be
the same as the disagreement between the Ronson and the Streber
approaches to the new, third view.'0o All agree that the previous
approaches of either always permitting the recovery of all interest
incurred on a tax underpayment, or never permitting the recovery of any
such interest are incorrect. The issue ultimately seems to devolve into a
burden of proof question; one, which in actuality seems to depend on
one's starting point. If the starting point is that the payment of interest
to a taxing authority is not really damages (i.e., per the no-interestrecovery view), then the burden of proving an exception to the rule
belongs on the plaintiff-as the majority in Frank and the Streber
interest differential approach hold. If the starting presumption is that the
payment of interest to a taxing authority does constitute damages (i.e.,
per the traditional, recovery-of-interest view), then the burden of proving
a "special benefit" to the plaintiff belongs on the defendant-as the
dissent in Frankwould hold and as Ronson did hold.
The dissent in Frankspecifically adopts the Ronson approach,' 06
and the majority in Frank specifically rejects the Ronson approach. 0 7
Interestingly, however, the majority in Frank, instead of adopting
Streber's interest differential approach, explicitly refuses to do so. 08 It
does go out of its way, however, not to reject this approach, but to leave
this for another day:
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 453.
Id. at 456-57.
Id at 457.
Id.
Id
See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
749 N.W.2d at 458-59.
Id. at 453-54.
Id at 454.
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We do not reject the interest differential approach as a possible
measure of damages, and we think that it could be one of the
circumstances referred to above in which a plaintiff could prove
damages from the payment of interest to the IRS . . . . Because the

Franks' evidence regarding interest differential was inadequate, we
need not decide in this case whether we would adopt the interest
differential approach. 0 9

With respect to the difference between the Ronson and Streber
approaches, it should be noted that in O'Bryan"o the Supreme Court of
South Dakota, while stopping short of adopting the Ronson approach,
seemed to be inclined toward that approach."' In fact, it never even
mentioned Streber.12 Contrariwise, in Amato'"3 the federal district court
in Pennsylvania followed the Streber approach and placed the burden of
proof on the plaintiff to show damages."i4 Similarly, Massachusetts also
seems to follow the Streber approach." 5
In connection with the third view, McCulloch"'6 merits brief
discussion.
McCulloch was decided about seven weeks before
Ronson,'17 and probably follows the traditional view that interest may be
recovered as damages." 8 However, in refusing to follow the no-interestrecovery view, the opinion contains some language reminiscent of
Ronson 's approach." 9 In McCulloch, in response to an argument based
on Leendertsen that interest damages on tax underpayments are
speculative and therefore ought not be recoverable, the Oregon Court of
Appeals stated that a plaintiff retains the burden of proof of the causation
and the amount of each claim for damages and that, "to the extent that
defendants choose to contend that the plaintiffs have failed to mitigate
damages, discovery is available to augment such an allegation." 2 0 If the
reference to mitigation of damages could be deemed to allow a

109. Id.
110. 2006 SD 56, 717 N.W.2d 632.
111. Id. 124, 717N.W.2d at 639-40.
112. Id., 717 N.W.2d at 639-40.
113. No. 06cv39, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57091 at *5 (M.D. Pa., Aug. 14,2006).
I14. See supra text accompanying note 84.
115. See Miller v. Volk, 825 N.E.2d 579 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005). The court's entire discussion
of the recoverability of interest consists of the following: "no proof was offered that the interest
paid to the IRS on the deficiency exceeded the value to the plaintiffs of having use of the money in
the meantime. There was, in other words, no proof of actionable damages." Id. at 582.
116. McCulloch v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 971 P.2d 414 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
117. Id. at 414; Ronson v. Talesnick, 33 F. Supp. 2d 347 (D. N.J. 1999).
118. McCulloch, 971 P.2d at 419.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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defendant to reduce recoverable damages by the earnings received by the
plaintiff on the tax underpayment, this would be almost identical with
the recovery permitted in Ronson.12' The only difference would be one
of nomenclature. Ronson refers to the reduction of recoverable damages
as coming under New Jersey's benefit rule, 12 2 while McCulloch refers to
the reduction instead as being by reason of mitigation.12 3 Alternatively,
this might simply be a reference to the universally recognized obligation
imposed upon plaintiffs to mitigate avoidable damages and nothing
more.124
It should be noted that in King v. Deutsche Bank AG,1 25 the federal
district court for the district of Oregon adopted the Streber interest
differential approach.126 However, there is no indication in the opinion
that the court was declaring Oregon law. Indeed, in this small segment
of the opinion in which only five cases are cited, none are from
Oregon.127 If the court were declaring Oregon law, its failure to discuss
or even cite McCulloch would be inexplicable.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT AND STATUS OF THE THREE VIEWS

In this portion of the article, I will briefly explore the development
of each of the views on the recoverability of interest on a tax
underpayment. The goal is to then present a tally of the jurisdictions
following each view. The tally is intended as a rough guide, not as being
final or even very definitive. As an initial matter it should be
emphasized that while I have done research to discover recent cases that
have addressed the issue, I have not attempted to systematically research
the law in each of the fifty states. Instead, my tally is based in part on an
earlier tally presented in a 2000 article,128 supplemented by the cases I
have encountered in writing in this area1 29 and by current research.

121. See Ronson, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 354-55.
122. Id.
123. McCulloch, 971 P.2d at 419.
124. See generally 3 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE

§ 21:10

(2009 ed.). Concomitantly, the mitigation costs become an element of recoverable damages.
125. No. CVO4-1029HU, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11317 (D. Or. May 9,2005).
126. Id. at *ll0.
127. Id. at *108-10.
128. Rule, supra note 23, at 177-78.
129. See, e.g., Jacob L. Todres, Malpractice and the Tax Practitioner: An Analysis of the
Areas in Which Malpractice Occurs, 48 Emory L. J. 547 (1999); Jacob L. Todres, Malpractice:
Areas in Which It Occurs and the Measure of Damages-An Update, 78 St. John's L. Rev. 1011
(2004); Tax MalpracticeDamages,supra note 1.
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There is always the possibility, or even the likelihood, that some cases
will have eluded me.
The second caveat in attempting to prepare a tally is that tallies are
inherently imprecise and there is often much room for differing
interpretations of the underlying cases. It is not always clear what the
view of any state is, nor, sometimes, even bow to interpret any given
case. For instance, Alaska is usually cited as a state following the nointerest-recovery view,' 30 based on the 1986 case of Orsini v. Bratten.'3 1
Nevertheless, a 1991 Illinois case listed Alaska as permitting the
recovery of such interestl 3 2 based on the later Alaska case of Thomas v.
Cleary.33
A second example of the difficulty of characterizing even what any
given case stands for is illustrated by O'Bryan v. Ashland.'3 4 In
O'Bryan, the South Dakota Supreme Court directly faced the issue of
whether interest paid on a tax underpayment may be recoverable as
damages from a negligent tax advisor.'3 5 At the beginning of the
opinion, the court indicated that this issue was "never before decided in
South Dakota." 3 6 Nevertheless, in Ronson v. Talesnick,'3 7 the New
Jersey federal district court'3 8 listed South Dakota among the
jurisdictions permitting the recovery of interest based on the earlier case
of Lien v. McGladrey & Pullen.'3 9 While acknowledging what Ronson
had done, and agreeing with the principle of law Ronson had gleaned
from Lien, the South Dakota Supreme Court nevertheless emphatically
stated that Lien never decided the issue, but that the court was doing so

only in O'Bryan.14 0
Before proceeding to review the development of each view and my
tally of states following the views, I wish to emphasize that when I refer
to the view permitting the recovery of interest, I intend to refer to the
situation where interest on the tax underpayment is recoverable as
damages without qualification.141 Similarly, when referring to the no130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
damages

See, e.g., Frank, 749 N.W.2d 443, 451 (Neb. 2008).
713 P.2d 791 (Alaska 1986).
Dail v. Adamson, 570 N.E.2d 1167, 1169 (Ill. App. 1991).
768 P.2d 1090, 1094 n.10 (Alaska 1989).
2006 SD 56, 717 N.W.2d 632, (S.D. 2006).
Id. 11, 717 N.W.2d at 633.
Id., 717 N.W.2d at 633.
33 F. Supp. 2d 347 (D. N.J. 1999).
Id. at 352.
509 N.W.2d 421, 426 (S.D. 1994).
O'Bryan, 2006 SD 56,1 15 n.9, 717 N.W.2d at 638 n.9.
The general duty of a plaintiff to mitigate damages is ignored because it pertains to all
and not particularly to interest incurred on a tax underpayment.
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interest-recovery view, I contemplate a view that absolutely refuses to
permit the recovery of such interest, with no exceptions. The third or
intermediate view refers to all views that are not absolute, but which
sometimes permit the recovery of interest depending upon the facts and
circumstances. For the tally, it is irrelevant whether the burden is
initially placed upon the plaintiff to prove some interest differential or if
the defendant is given the burden of proving some special benefit to the
plaintiff. So long as there is not an absolute rule either permitting or
denying the recovery of such interest, such position is placed in the third,
intermediate view.
A.

Traditional View-PermittingInterest Recovery

Under traditional tort damages doctrine, all damages directly
flowing from a defendant's negligence are recoverable.14 2 Accordingly,
interest incurred on a tax underpayment is recoverable according to this
view because it was caused by the tax advisor's negligence.143 Today,
the following thirteen states seem to follow this view: Alabama,144

Arizona,145 Florida,146 Illinois,1 47 Iowa,14 8 Louisiana, 149 Maryland,so
Nevada,' 5' North Carolina,' 5 2 Ohio,1'

Oklahoma,5

4

Wisconsin,"' and

142. BERNARD WOLFMAN, ET. AL., STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE § 605.1.1 (6th ed. 2004); 3
MALLEN & SMITH, supranote 128, at § 21:1, § 21:4.
143. Id. See also Tax MalpracticeDamages, supranote 1, at 724-25.
144. Jamison, Money, Farmer & Co. v. Standeffer, 678 So.2d 1061, 1066-67 (Ala. 1996).
145. Jobe v. Int'l Ins. Co., 933 F. Supp. 844, 860 (D. Ariz. 1995), order withdrawnpursuant to
settlement, I F. Supp. 2d 1403 (D. Ariz. 1997).
146. Jones v. Childers, No. 88-85-CIV-T-22C, 1992 WL 300845, at *12 (M.D. Fla. June 26,
1992), af'dandrev'donother grounds, 18 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 1994).
147. Jerry Clark Equip. Inc. v. Hibbits, 612 N.E.2d 858, 861-63, 865 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Dail
v. Adamson, 570 N.E.2d 1167, 1169 (111. App. Ct. 1991); Sorenson v. Fio Rito, 413 N.E.2d 47, 51,
53, 55 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
148. Cameron v. Montgomery, 225 N.W.2d 154, 155-56 (Iowa 1975).
149. Slaughter v. Roddie, 249 So. 2d 584, 586 (La. Ct. App. 1971).
150. Shofer v. Stuart Hack Co., 723 A.2d 481 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999), cert. denied, 731
A.2d 440 (Md. 1999).
151. Warmbrodt v. Blanchard, 692 P.2d 1282, 1284 n.2 (Nev. 1984).
152. Estate of Smith v. Underwood, 487 S.E.2d 807, 817 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997).
153. Hall v. Gill, 670 N.E.2d 503, 506 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); Wyatt v. Smith, Nos. 92 CA 104,
91 CV 400, 1993 WL 518630, at *1, *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 15, 1993); Harrell v. crystal, 611
N.E.2d 908, 913-14 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
154. King v. Neal, 2001 OK Civ. App. 11, T 1-13, 19 P.3d 899, 900-02; Wynn v. Estate of
Holmes, 815 P.2d 1231, 1236 (Okla. Civ. App. 1991), overruled on another issue by Stroud v.
Arthur Anderson & Co., 2001 OK 76, 37 P.3d 783 (Okla. 2001).
155. Merriam v. Cont'1 Cas. Co., No. 98-2522-FT, 597 N.W.2d 774, 1999 WL 326183, at *4-6
(Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (table opinion).
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Wyoming.156 In a number of these states the courts simply awarded
interest without discussing the issue.'5 7 In two of the states the law was
declared by a federal court rather than a state court. 58
Oregon probably also belongs with these thirteen states,'" though
there may be some uncertainty about this. I included it in this group in
60
my recent Tax Malpractice Damages article,1
as did another author in
6
an earlier article.' ' Also, Oregon's McCulloch case was cited several
times as standing for this proposition.16 2 There is, however, reason to
possibly place Oregon in the third view.
Oregon's position was declared in McCulloch v. Price
Waterhouse LLP,'6 3 which involved a suit against an accountant and his
firm for a deficient estate tax retum.'1" At trial, the plaintiff recovered
damages that included interest paid to the IRS.' 6 5 One of the issues on
appeal was the trial judge's refusal to rule that the recovery of damages
for such interest is precluded as a matter of law.'6 6 In addressing this
issue the court noted that the issue was one of first impression in
Oregon.'6 7 The court extensively analyzed the no-interest-recovery
view, 6 1 very clearly declined to adopt it, and held the plaintiff could
recover such interest as damages.' 6 9 What is not very clear is whether
the court was simply adopting the traditional view which absolutely
permits the recovery of interest or if it was really more circumscribed
and was adopting a position that today would be characterized as fitting
within the middle, third view. McCulloch itself must have assumed it
was adopting the traditional view, since there was then no third view. 70

156. Adel v. Parkhurst, 681 P.2d 886, 889 (Wyo. 1984).
157. See, e.g., Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming, supra notes 142-47 and 150-56, respectively.
158. Arizona and Florida, supra notes 145-46.
159. See McCulloch v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 971 P.2d 414 (Or. Ct. App 1998).
160. Tax MalpracticeDamages, supra note 1, at 724 n.l 10.
161. Rule, supra note 23, at 178.
162. See, e.g., Frank, 749 N.W.2d 443, 457 n.l (Neb. 2008) (dissent); King v. Neal, 2001 OK
Civ. App. 11, 1 13, 19 P.3d at 902. But see O'Bryan v. Ashland, 2006 SD 56, T 17, 717 N.W.2d
632, 637.
163. 971 P.2d 414 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). See also supra text accompanying notes 29-32 and
116-25.
164. 971 P.2d at 415.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 417.
168. Id. at 417-19.
169. Id. at 419.
170. McCulloch was decided about seven weeks before Ronson. Also, none of the subsequent
cases treat McCulloch as belonging to the third view.
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If it was intending to establish a novel, new view, it would have needed
to do so much more explicitly than the ambiguous, circumscribed
language it used.17 '
In refusing to accept the defendant's argument, based on
Leendertsen, that interest damages are too speculative to be recoverable
McCulloch stated,
We note that plaintiffs retain the burden of proof of the causation and
amount of each claim of damage by a preponderance of the evidence
and that, to the extent that defendants choose to contend that plaintiffs
have failed to mitigate their damage, discovery is available . . . to

augment their allegations. Accordingly, we decline to adopt the rule
that defendants propose. We hold that, under the circumstances of this
case, plaintiff is not barred as a matter of law from seeking damages
based on the interest obligation that he owes to the IRS.172
If the court is simply referring to the generally recognized
obligation imposed on all plaintiffs to prove their damages and also to
mitigate damages, McCulloch is simply following the traditional view
allowing the recovery of interest.173 Its use of the qualifying clause,
"under the circumstances of this case" in the last sentence in the above
quote would simply be the general caution of careful jurists to decide a
case as narrowly as possible. 174 Alternatively, if the reference to
mitigation of damages could be deemed to allow a defendant to reduce
recoverable interest damages by any earnings received by the plaintiff on
the tax underpayment, then this is very similar to the type of recovery
obtained in Ronson"' or by StreberS176 interest differential approach.
Since there was no third view extant yet, this second alternative seems

171. See McCulloch, 971 P. 2d at 419.
172. Id. at 419 (footnote omitted).
173. See id
174. Id.
175. See 33 F. Supp. 2d. 347, 354-55 (D. N.J. 1999).
176. See 221 F.3d 701, 734-45.
177. In O'Bryan, the Supreme Court of South Dakota's discussion of McCulloch is ambiguous,
and could almost be read to mean that McCulloch belongs in the newer third view. 717 N.W.2d 632,
637-38. However, the court in one string cite includes with McCulloch a reference to Ronson,
clearly belonging in the third, intermediate view, but also references to Jobe v. International Ins.
Co., 933 F. Supp. 844 (D. Ariz. 1995), order withdrawn pursuant to settlement, I F. Supp. 2d 1403
(D. Ariz. 1997), Dail v. Adamson, 570 N.E.2d 1167 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991), and Wynn v. Estate of
Holmes, 1991 OK Civ. App. 78, 815 P. 2d 1231 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991), overruled on another issue,
Stroud v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 2001 OK 76, 37 P.3d 783 the latter three belonging to the
traditional view allowing interest. 2006 SD 56, 1l7, 717 N.W.2d at 637. Amato v. KPMG LLP, No.
06cv39, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57091 at *16-17 (M.D. Pa. 2006), cites this discussion in O'Bryan
with seeming approval.
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remote. So, I assume, ultimately, McCulloch probably is simply another
case following the traditional view, though, perhaps, a precursor of the
third view to come. However, because of the possibility that McCulloch
is not simply adopting the traditional view, I have not directly added
Oregon to the list of majority view jurisdictions.
Just to confuse things a bit further, in King v. Deutsche Bank AG, 78
the federal district court for the district of Oregon simply adopted the
Streber interest differential approach, the third view. 179 There is no
indication in the case, however, that the court was declaring Oregon law.
McCulloch is not even cited in the opinion and none of the five cases
cited by the court in this small portion of the opinion is from Oregon. 80
I, therefore, believe the court in King adopted the Streber approach as its
rule of law and was not addressing Oregon's position.
Before leaving the traditional view discussion, a brief caveat about
Florida and North Carolina. Both of these were included among the
states following the traditional view based on the cases cited above.' 8 '
There is some language in Loftin v. KPMG LLP which might suggest the
court viewed these states as belonging in the no-interest view. 18 2 This
conclusion seems remote, though, and would be inconsistent with the
cases noted above. I, therefore, believe it is appropriate to include
Florida and North Carolina among the states following the traditional
view.
Loftin involved a plaintiff who was put into two ineffective tax
shelters.183 His return for the earlier year was audited and the primary
defendant, KPMG, encouraged him to settle.' 84 While pursuing a
settlement agreement with the IRS, the plaintiff sued the defendants for
damages based on various causes of action including fraud and
malpractice.' 8 5 In this case, the court granted the defendants' motions to
dismiss because there were no damages yet, and the case was therefore
premature.' 86 The state law claims involved were governed by either
Florida or North Carolina law.1 87 The court did not decide which law

178. No. CV 04-1029-HU, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11317 (D. Or. Mar. 8,2005).
179. Id. at *110.
180. Id. at *108-10.
181. See supra notes 161-81.
182. No. 02-81166-CIV-RYSKAMP/VITUNAC, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26909, *24,29 (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 10, 2003).
183. Id. at *5-6.
184. Id. at *8.
185. Id. at *3-9.
186. Id. at *29.
187. See id. at *22 n.4.
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governed because it held both laws were the same with respect to the
issues involved.' 88 After holding the plaintiffs' claims for fraud and
negligent misrepresentation were premature, the court added "[i]ndeed if
Loftin's settlement payments amount to nothing more than payment for
... interest, he will not have suffered an injury."l 89 Later, with regard
to one of the plaintiffs malpractice claims, the court held it was
premature "for the same reasons the rest of his state law claims are
premature." 90 If this latter quote can be deemed to also incorporate by
reference the court's earlier observation that simply paying interest is not
damages to the plaintiff, the court is putting Florida and North Carolina
in the no-interest view. However, this would seem to be reading too
much into a general reference that the malpractice claim is also
premature. Accordingly, I have ignored this possibility, and counted
both states among traditional states allowing the recovery of interest.
B.

No-Interest View
The no interest view developed between 1986 and 1996 in four

states-Alaska,1 9' California,192 New York, 19 3 and Washington. 94

in

California the law was declared by a federal district court.195 While it
briefly appeared this view may have picked up tWO1 96 new adherents,
Massachusetts and Nebraska, 197 this turned out not to be the case.198

188. Id.
189. Id. at *24.
190. Id. at *29.
191. Orsini v. Bratten, 713 P.2d 791, 794 (Alaska 1986).
192. Eckert Cold Storage, Inc. v. Behl, 943 F. Supp. 1230, 1235 (E.D. Cal. 1996).
193. Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 315 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
194. Leendertsen v. Price Waterhouse, 916 P.2d 449, 451 (Wash Ct. App. 1996).
195. Eckert, 943 F. Supp. 1230.
196. As was noted in the text, supra text accompanying notes 182-90, Loftin v. KPMG LLP,
No. 02-81166-CIV-RYSKAMP/VITUNAC, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26909 (S. D. Fla. Sept. 10,
2003) might possibly be read to state that Florida and North Carolina also follow this view.
However, this is ignored herein because such an interpretation seems quite strained and there are
cases in each state putting them in the traditional view allowing the recovery of interest. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Childers, No. 88-85-CIV-T-22C, 1992 WL 300845, at *12 (M.D. Fla. June 26, 1992), affd
and rev'd on other grounds,18 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 1994); Estate of Smith v. Underwood, 487
S.E.2d 807, 817 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997).
197. See Sorenson v. H&R Block, Inc. No. 99-10268-DPW, 2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS 18689, at
*45-46 (D. Mass Aug. 27, 2002), af'd, 107 F. App'x 227 (1st Cir. 2004); J.D. Warehouse v. Lutz &
Co., 639 N.W.2d 88, 92, 93-94 (Neb. 2002).
198. See infra text accompany notes 252-70.
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Currently, these four states, and the original cases in which they adopted
the no-interest view, are still cited as the only followers of this view.'9 9
Except for New York, there have not been any notable
developments in the other three states following this view. In Alaska,
the no-interest view was promulgated by the Alaska Supreme Court in
1986 in Orsini v. Bratten.20 0 There was some language in Thomas v.
Cleary,20 1 a 1989 decision of the Alaska Supreme Court, which was read
by some out-of-state courts as being consistent with the traditional view
allowing the recovery of interest. 20 2 However, several years later, in a
case involving a breach of fiduciary claim against an estate's personal
representative,203 the Alaska Supreme Court held interest was not
recoverable, based on Orsini.204 Thomas was never even cited in the
court's brief focus on this issue.205
In both California and Washington, recent cases reaffirmed
adherence to the no-interest view based on stare decisis, and without any
reexamination of the issues or reference to the recent emergence of the
intermediate, third view. 2 0 6 Both Fallon2 07 and Malone208 were decided
in federal district courts, not in state courts. In Washington, Malone
simply followed Leendertsen, even to the point of repeating its
erroneous statement that the no-interest view is the majority view.209
New York adopted the no-interest view in Alpert v. Shea Gould
Climenko & Casey.210 Alpert is still recognized as the New York
position both inside21" and outside2 12 of New York. The reasoning of

199. See, e.g., Frank v. Lockwood, 749 N.W.2d 443, 451 (Neb. 2008); Amato v. KPMG LLP,
No. 06cv36, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57091, at *15-16 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2006); O'Bryan v.
Ashland, 2006 SD 56, 13-16, 717 N.W.2d 632, 636-37.
200. 713 P. 2d 791, 794 (Alaska 1996).
201. 768 P.2d 1090, 1091-92 n.5 (Alaska 1989).
202. See, e.g., Dail v. Adamson, 570 N.E.2d 1167, 1169 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). Cf Jobe v. Int'l
Ins. Co., 933 F. Supp. 844, 860 (D. Ariz. 1995), order withdrawnpursuant to settlement, I F. Supp.
2d 1403 (D. Ariz. 1997); O'Bryan,2006 SD 56,120, 717 N.w.2d at 638-39.
203. Gudschinsky v. Hartil, 815 P.2d 851, 852 (Alaska 1991).
204. Id. at 856.
205. Id.
206. See Fallon v. Locke, Liddell & Sapp, LLP, No. C-04-03210 RMW, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXLS 67708, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2008); Malone v. Nuber, No. C07-2046RSL, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 48461, at *50 (W.D. Wash. June 23, 2008).
207. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67708.
208. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48461.
209. Id. at *50.
210. 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 315 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
211. See, e.g., Shalam v. KPMG LLP, 843 N.Y.S.2d 17, 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007); Gertler v.
Sol Masch & Co., 835 N.Y.S.2d 178, 179 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007); Penner v. Hoffberg Oberfest
Burger & Berger, 755 N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); Blumberg v. Altman, 841 N.Y.S.2d
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Alpert is that the payment of interest is not damages but simply a
payment for the use of money during a period of time the plaintiff was
not entitled to it, and further, if interest were awarded as damages the
plaintiff would have a windfall of having both the use of the money and
recovering the interest thereon.213 Approximately twelve years after
Alpert, another panel of the same First Department that decided Alpert
decided Jamie Towers Housing Co. v. Lucas,2 14 which seems
fundamentally inconsistent with Alpert.
In Jamie Towers the plaintiff, a residential housing cooperative,
incurred over $470,000 in interest when its managing agent failed to
timely pay real estate taxes for the 1991/1992 tax year.215 In this suit the
plaintiff was seeking to recover the interest from its former managing
agent and its former accountant.2 16 The lower court dismissed the
complaint on defendant's summary judgment motion based upon
Alpert.217 The First Department reversed, holding Alpert inapposite.2 18
The First Department's analysis in its entirety follows:
Here, however, plaintiff, allegedly through no fault of its own, was
unnecessarily caused to pay $472,043 in interest to the City due to its
managing agent's failure to timely pay certain real estate taxes for the
1991/1992 tax year. As such, the recovery of such interest as an
element of its damages would not constitute an impermissible windfall
or put plaintiff in a "better position" than it was in prior to its
managing agent's alleged misfeasance and it should be entitled to
prove such damages, if any. Those would ordinarily be measured not
by the difference in interest rates charged by the City and the IRS, but
by the actual amount of interest and late charges paid to the City due to
the alleged misfeasance, subject to any offset of the actual income
derived from the funds in question during the relevant period of
time.219

818, 836 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007); and Thies v. Bryan Cave, 831 N.Y.S.2d 350, 2006 WL 2883815, at
*11-12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) (table), affd, 826 N.Y.S.2d 54 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
212. See, e.g., Frank v. Lockwood, 749 N.W.2d 443, 451 (Neb. 2008); and Amato v. KPMG
LLP, No. 06cv39, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57091, at * 13-14 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2006); O'Bryan v.
Ashland, 2006 SD 56, 13, 15, 717 N.W.2d at 636-37. See also Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 341
F. Supp. 2d 363, 383-84 (S.D.N.Y.), amended on reconsideration,03 CIV. 6942 (SAS), 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21589 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
213. 559 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
214. 745 N.Y.S.2d 532 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
215. Id. at 533.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 533-34.
219. Id. (citation omitted).
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It is very difficult to understand why Alpert is distinguishable. In
both situations the plaintiff ended up retaining possession of money he,
or it, was not entitled to. 22 0 In Jamie Towers it was due to the error of
the managing agent in not paying real estate taxes.2 2 1 In Alpert it was
due to the error of the tax advisor in advising the plaintiff that he had
legitimate tax reductions.22 2 In both situations the plaintiff had use of
the money until the error was discovered and the money repaid. Yet in
Jamie Towers the First Department held the recovery of interest was not
an impermissible windfall,223 while in Alpert it held it would be.224 The
cases may differ because in Alpert the plaintiff intentionally sought the
tax shelter, intentionally utilized it, and paid less taxes than otherwise
would have been payable,225 while in Jamie Towers the underpayment
Also, Alpert involved
arose inadvertently due to an error.226
underpayment of income taxes 22 7 while Jamie Towers involved
underpayment of city real estate taxes. 22 8 However, these seem to be
distinctions without differences; in both instances the end result is the
same: the plaintiff had use of a sum of money to which he or it was not
entitled.
Despite the fact that Jamie Towers seems to be fundamentally
inconsistent with Alpert, many later cases simply cite Alpert for the norecovery-of interest proposition and never even bother to cite Jamie
While some cases do address the existence of Jamie
Towers.22 9
Towers,230 and attempt to distinguish it, their reasons for distinguishing
220. See Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990);
Jamie Towers v. William B. Lucas, Inc., 745 N.Y.S.2d 532 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
221. Jamie Towers, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
222. Alpert, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 313-314.
223. In Jamie Towers the measure of damages adopted by the court was that of the
intermediate, third view, (i.e., the difference between the interest paid reduced by the actual income
derived from the money during the relevant time). 745 N.Y.S.2d at 534.
224. Alpert, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
225. 449 N.Y.S.2d at 313-14.
226. Jamie Towers, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
227. Alpert, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 313-14.
228. Jamie Towers, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
229. See, e.g., Gertler v. Sol Masch & Co., 835 N.Y.S.2d 178, 179 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007);
Penner v. Hoffberg Oberfest Burger & Berger, 755 N.Y.S.2d 835, 836 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003);
Blumberg v.Altman, 841 N.Y.S.2d 818 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007); Rosenbach v. Diversified Group, Inc.,
819 N.Y.S.2d. 851, availableat 2006 WL 1310656, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006); Williams v. Sidley
Austin Brown & Wood, 816 N.Y.S.2d 702, 2006 WL 684599, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) (table), on
reconsideration,824 N.Y.S.2d 759 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006), affd, 832 N.Y.S.2d 9 (N.Y. App. Div.
2007)..
230. See, e.g., Shalam v. KPMG LLP, 843 N.Y.S.2d 17, 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007); Thies v.
Bryan Cave, 831 N.Y.S.2d 350, available at 2006 WL 2883815, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) af'd,
826 N.Y.S.2d 54 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
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it do not seem compelling. For instance, in Thies v. Bryan Cave LLP, 2 3 1
a case involving a suit against two law firms that gave opinions with
respect to investments in an ineffective tax shelter, the court
distinguished Jamie Towers because the plaintiff in Thies intentionally
decided not to pay the taxes in question.2 32 I fail to comprehend any
difference in final result if the retained funds were obtained due to an
oversight-forgetting to pay real estate taxes--or to intentionally and in
good faith relying on an attorney's advice that a tax reduction was valid.
Similarly, in Shalam v. KPMG LLP, which also involved a suit
against a tax advisor for advice to invest in a bad tax shelter, the First
Department held interest was not recoverable per Alpert.233 The court
held that Jamie Towers (and also Ronson) were distinguishable because
they involved "negligence by an accountant or other agent resulting in
exposure to liability that would not have been incurred, 'but for their
accountant's negligence." 2 34 Again, if paying interest for the use of
funds that one is not entitled to does not constitute damages, why does
the circumstance of how the funds were obtained matter? Also, the
lower court in Shalam seems to have decided that Alpert governed,
rather than Jamie Towers, because the facts of Shalam and Alpert were
more analogous in that each involved a bad tax shelter.235
236
In Apple Bank for Savings v. PricewaterhouseCoopers,LLP, a
trial court within the First Department followed Jamie Towers and had a
very original and novel interpretation of what Alpert stood for. In Apple
Bank the issue before the court involved whether the defendant
accounting firm gave the plaintiff bank incorrect advice concerning the
tax consequences of how the bank redeemed stock from the estate of its
sole shareholder.237 The case arose on the defendant's motion for
summary judgment dismissing the complaint.238 One of the grounds
asserted for dismissal was that under Alpert any interest incurred by the
bank was not recoverable. 23 9 The court, however, denied the motion for
summary judgment and read Alpert very narrowly to prevent the

231. 831 N.Y.S.2d 350, availableat 2006 WL 2883815, at *5.
232. Id. at *5.
233. Shalam, 843 N.Y.S.2d at 18-19.
234. Id. at 19.
235. Shalam v. KPMG LLP, I12732/05, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2380, at *3841 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2006).
236. 603492/06, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1176, at *2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2009), rev'd, 73
A.D.3d 438, 895 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1st Dep't. 2010).
237. Id at *2-5.
238. Id.at*1-3.
239. Id. at *6.
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recovery of interest only where the plaintiff inevitably would have
incurred the tax liability even if the plaintiff had not relied on the faulty
tax advice. 24 0 "However, if the tax liability would have been avoided
but for the erroneous advice, it appears that . . . interest would be

recoverable in order to make the plaintiff whole." 24 1 As authority for
this proposition the court cited Jamie Towers and Penner v. Hof/berg
Oberfest Burger & Berger.242 Penner, however, is a very short opinion
in which the court's entire focus on the recovery of interest (and back
taxes) was to uphold the lower court's dismissal of plaintiff's cause of
action, "since plaintiffs tax liability was not attributable, to an act or
omission on defendants' part." 24 3 This hardly seems an adequate basis
for such a dramatic narrowing of Alpert from simply holding there is
never any recovery of interest in such situations.
While Apple Bank is the most recent exposition of Alpert, (a) it is a
lower court holding, and one that is not officially reported, 2 " (b) it was
reversed on appeal, but solely on unrelated statute of limitations
grounds, 24 5 (c) Penner seems to be very weak, if any, authority, 246 and
(d) in light of the history of invisibility of Jamie Towers, it is unclear
how strong the Jamie Towers precedent is. Accordingly, it is impossible
to assess the strength of Apple Bank. Only time will tell if Apple Bank
has successfully narrowed the scope of Alpert.
At some point in time, it appeared as if both Nebraska and
Massachusetts might have adopted the minority view, but in both
instances this was, at best, transient. In J.D. Warehouse v. Lutz & Co.,247
the Nebraska Supreme Court indicated that the district court below had
expressly held that interest paid to the IRS was not a proper element of
damages for reasons that paralleled those of the minority view. 24 8 The
Nebraska Supreme Court, however, never focused on this part of the

240. Id at *6, 9.
241. Id. at *6. The court's holding also applied to the recoverability of additional taxes caused
by the defendant's negligent advice.
242. Id. at *6-7. The court actually cited Pennerfirst, but as a parenthetical.
243. Penner v. Hoffberg Oberfest Burger & Berger, 755 N.Y.S.2d 835, 836 (N.Y. App. Div.
2003).
244. Apple Bank, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1176.
245. As a threshold matter the trial court held the statute of limitations was tolled under the
continuous representation doctrine. It therefore proceeded to the substantive issues. On appeal, the
court held the statute of limitations was not tolled and dismissed the complaint as time-barred
without addressing the substance.
246. See supra note 243.
247. 639 N.W.2d 88 (Neb. 2002).
248. Id. at 92.
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lower court's opinion.24 9 What, if anything, could have been made of
this is now moot because in Frank v. Lockwood250 the Nebraska
Supreme Court placed Nebraska squarely in the intermediate, third
view. 251
The situation in Massachusetts is somewhat analogous to that of
Nebraska, though the court that seemingly adopted the minority view
was the local federal district court rather than a state court.252 Also, the
portion of the opinion addressing this issue is so internally inconsistent
and erroneous that its validity is questionable.2 53 Sorenson v. H&R
Block, Inc.254 involved an accusation by plaintiff that one of the
defendant's employees reported his suspicions to the IRS that the
plaintiff planned to file fraudulent 1993 income tax returns before the
returns were actually filed.255 Virtually all of plaintiffs claims for
damages were dismissed except for a limited breach of contract claim
that H&R Block did not keep his tax information confidential and a
rather technical violation of the Massachusetts False and Deceptive
Trade Practices Act.256 Total damages of only $630 were awarded.257
Any statements by the court concerning tort damages recoverable were
probably, therefore, dicta, at best.
In Sorenson, the federal district court combined its discussion of the
possibility of recovering additional taxes, interest, and penalties.258 As
to interest and penalties, the court stated that the Massachusetts courts
had not addressed the issue, and that the weight of authority followed the
no-interest recovery rule of Alpert.259 The court then stated that Eckert
Cold Storage, Inc. v. Behl reached the opposite conclusion based on
California law, but Eckert nevertheless acknowledged that Alpert
represented the majority view.260 While Eckert and Alpert reached
different results as to the recovery of additional taxes caused by the

249. Id.
250. 749 N.W.2d 443 (2008).
251. See supra text accompanying notes 85-110.
252. See Sorenson v. H&R Block CIV.A.99-10268-DPW, 2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS 18689 (D.
Mass. Aug. 27, 2002), af'd, 107 F. App'x 227 (1st Cir. 2004).
253. See id. at *45-46.
254. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18689.
255. Id. at *2-3.
256. Id. at *62.
257. See Sorenson v. H&R. Block, Inc., No. 03-2268, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 17723, at *3 (1st
Cir. 2004).
258. Sorenson, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18689, at *45-46.
259. Id at *45.
260. Id at *46.
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negligence of a tax advisor, both follow the no-interest view 26 1 and the
court was simply wrong when it stated they differed with respect to the
recoverability of interest. Also, the recovery of penalties caused by a
negligent tax advisor is very different from the treatment of interest on a
tax underpayment. With regard to penalties, there is no issue of plaintiff
having had use of the money or any windfall type of concern. Any
penalties incurred are out-of-pocket damages and are clearly
recoverable.262
Without belaboring any further the authoritativeness of Sorenson
on this issue, it should be noted that in Miller v. Volk2 6 3 the
Massachusetts Appeals Court adopted the intermediate, third view,2 6
thus removing Massachusetts from the no interest camp, even assuming
Sorenson placed Massachusetts there to begin with.

C

Intermediate Third View

Most of the cases following the intermediate, third view have been
discussed previously in Part II of this article. Thus, New Jersey, Texas,
South Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Nebraska adhere to this view, as
pronounced in Ronson, Streber, O'Bryan, Amato and Frank,
respectively. 265 Ronson 26 6and Amato were decided by the local federal
district courts. 267 Streber was decided by the Fifth Circuit, 268 while
O'Bryan 269 and Fran2 70 were decided by the Supreme Courts of South
Dakota and Nebraska, respectively. While South Dakota seemed
favorably inclined towards Ronson's approach of awarding the plaintiff
interest and imposing the burden on the defendant to show special
benefits to the plaintiff, in O'Bryan the South Dakota Supreme Court
declined to adopt the Ronson approach and left that issue for a later

261. See supra notes 192-93 and 211-14.
262. See, e.g., Frank v. Lockwood, 749 N.w.2d 443, 454-55 (Neb. 2008); Blumberg v.
Altman, 841 N.Y.S.2d 818, 818. See generally Tax Malpractice Damages,supra note 1, at 731.
263. 825 N.E.2d 579 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005).
264. Id. at 582.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 101-16.
266. Ronson's articulation of New Jersey law was followed by Carroll v. LeBouef, Lamb,
Greene & MacRae, L.L.P. 392 F. Supp. 2d 621, 629 (S.D. N.Y. 2005).
267. Ronson v. Talesnick, 33 F. Supp. 2d 347 (D. N.J. 1999); Amato v. KPMG LLP, No.
06cv39, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57091 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 14,2006).
268. 21 F.3d 701.
269. O'Bryan v. Ashland, 2006 SD 56, 717 N.W.2d 632.
270. Frank v. Lockwood, 749 N.w.2d 443 (Neb. 2008).
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day.27 1 While both Amato and the majority in Frank placed the burden
of proof on the plaintiff to establish any interest damages, neither
adopted the Streber interest differential approach.272 Amato did this by
silence,2 73 while Frank explicitly left this for another day.274
In Miller v. Volk the Appeals Court of Massachusetts seemed to
have summarily adopted the intermediate view without any express
focus on the issues.275 In holding that no proof of actionable damages
existed as a result of claimed negligent tax advice, the court pointed to
the fact that "no proof was offered that the interest paid to the IRS on the
deficiency exceeded the value to the plaintiffs of having use of the
money in the meantime."2 76 The court, thus, also appears to place the
burden of proof on the plaintiff.
Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist involved a suit by an investor in a
bad tax shelter to recover various damages incurred.277 With respect to
interest, the federal district court for the Southern District of New York
held that Virginia law governed.278 The court further held that Virginia
courts had not directly addressed this issue. 27 9 Based on Virginia's
approach to the "benefits rule," the court held Virginia would award
interest paid by the plaintiff as damages, but permit the defendant to
establish that a special benefit has been conferred upon the plaintiff that
ought to be considered in mitigation.28 0 In short, that Virginia would
follow the same approach as New Jersey, as articulated in Ronson.
In King v. Deutsche Bank A G2 8 1 the Oregon federal district court
adopted the Streber interest differential approach.2 82 While the court did
take note of the parties' arguments and cited various cases on point, the
court rather summarily adopted the Streber approach. 283 This is
troubling because the court did not indicate if it was simply adopting this

271. O'Bryan, 2006 SD 56,124,717 N.W.2d at 640.
272. Amato, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57091, at *18; Frank, 749 N.W.2d at 454.
273. Amato, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57091, at *17-18. Amato did place the burden of proof on
the plaintiff to show damages but it never referred to Streber. Id.
274. Frank, 749 N.W.2d at 454.
275. 825 N.E.2d at 581 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005).
276. Id. at 582.
277. 341 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), amended on reconsideration,03 CIV 6942 (SAS),
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21589 (S.D. N.Y. Oct. 26, 2004).
278. Id. at 384.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 384-85.
281. No. CVO4-1029HU, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11317 (D. Ore. Mar. 8, 2005).
282. Id.at*110.
283. Id. at *108-10.
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view for itself, or if this was meant to reflect the law in Oregon.2 8" It
seems almost impossible to assume this was intended as a statement of
Oregon law because (a) the court never indicated it was so intended, and
(b) the court never even cited the McCulloch opinion of the Oregon
Court of Appeals that contained a very thoughtful and careful analysis of
the issues.285 In light of this, it seems that King should be read as
adopting the Streber approach only for the federal district court for
Oregon and nothing more.
D.

Conclusion and Tally

The following table summarizes the conclusions reached in this
part.
STATES FOLLOWING:

Traditional View
Allowing Recovery of

Intermediate ViewNo-tuterest Recovery

Defvnds on Facts and

Alaska
California
New York
Washington

Massachusetts
Nebraska
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
South Dakota
Texas
Virginia

Alabama
Arizona
Florida
Illinois
Iowa
Louisiana
Maryland
Nevada
North Carolina
Ohio

Federal district
court for Oregon

Oklahoma
Wisconsin

Wyoming
Totals 13

4

7 (8?)

(Oregon?)

This table is intended solely as a current snapshoe 86 and only as a
very general guide.
Cases may lend themselves to different
interpretations and changes may always occur. The only thing that

284. Id.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 126-28 and 179-81.
286. As of late June 2010.
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seems reasonably certain is that the traditional view allowing the
recovery of interest is, and probably always was, the majority view.287
The no interest view is clearly a minority view-even if the two
transient adherentS288 are taken into account. Any statement in certain
cases that this view is, or ever was, the majority view seems incorrect.
The intermediate, third view seems to be growing and today has more
adherents than the minority, no-interest view.
IV. REFLECTIONS ON THE THREE VIEWS

The development of the law on the recoverability of interest on a
tax underpayment as damages is a wonderful case study of how law
evolves. First came the traditional, majority view that such interest is
recoverable as a simple application of traditional tort damage principles.
Since the defendant's negligence caused the plaintiff to incur such
interest costs, the costs were recoverable as damages under traditional
doctrine. Over time, the injustice, or potential injustice, that such an
absolute rule could create, became apparent. The spectre of awarding
interest damages to a plaintiff who had use of the unpaid tax money
caused the no-interest-recovery view to be born. This view dealt with
the problem by adopting the exact opposite of the traditional approach
and absolutely prohibited the recovery of such interest. While this
certainly remedied the problem of possible unjust enrichment of a
plaintiff who had both the use of the tax underpayment and who also
recovered the interest paid for the use of such money, it created a
different type of injustice, i.e., what about the plaintiff who did not earn
as much on the money in his possession as the interest charged by the
government? These concerns, in turn, spurred the development of the
modern, intermediate, third view that eschewed absolutes and attempted
to apply more precise justice by permitting the recovery of interest but
only when, and to the extent, appropriate. While this latter view split
into two different approaches as to how to cure the perceived problemeither by (1) presuming interest is not generally recoverable, but by
permitting a meritorious plaintiff to prove otherwise, or (2) presuming
interest is generally recoverable, but permitting the defendant to show a

287. Although there was no intermediate, third view recognized yet and although the list of
specific states following the traditional view is a bit different, an authority in 2000 counted fourteen
states (actually thirteen if a state counted twice is eliminated), as allowing a recovery of interest and
the same four states as not allowing the recovery of interest. Rule, supra note 23, at 177-78.
288. See the discussion of Nebraska and Massachusetts, supra text accompanying notes 24764.
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special benefit to the plaintiff-both approaches seem to effectively deal
with the problems wrought by both predecessor views.
In contemplating the three views, the intermediate, third approach
clearly seems best. It eschews both extreme, absolute views and permits
awarding damages based on the particular circumstances of the
particular litigants before the court. This seems to be widely recognized
because, as developed in Parts II and III above, since the Ronson case in
2000, no court unconstrained by precedent has adopted either the
traditional, majority view or the minority view but, instead, has adopted
some form of the intermediate, third view.289 It, therefore, clearly
deserves the appellation of the "modern" view.
While it might be nice if jurisdictions following the traditional and
minority views would change and adopt the modern view, I am not
certain if this is necessary for the traditional view jurisdictions. The
reason for this is that most jurisdictions, perhaps even all, impose upon
plaintiffs a duty to mitigate their damages.290 If these jurisdictions
would simply treat any earnings received (or, perhaps, receivable) by a
plaintiff on tax underpayments as mitigating any interest damages
otherwise recoverable by plaintiff, the result would be virtually the same
as under the modern view. There would be no need to change their
jurisprudence. As indicated previously, this might be exactly what
Oregon did in McCulloch.29 1
With respect to the minority, no-interest view, I believe the
situation is different. It certainly should not be adopted by any
jurisdiction having no law on point. I also would urge that it should be
replaced by the modern view in those four jurisdictions that follow it.
My reasons for this are twofold. First, I believe this view was totally
supplanted by the modern view and simply has run out of steam. It
originated in 1986 in Alaska in Orsini.2 92 New York adopted it in 1990
in Alpert,293 and it was adopted in 1996 in California and Washington.294
Although it may have gained two temporary adherents,2 95 today it is still
followed in only these same four states. While recent cases in these

289. See supra text accompanying notes 33-128.
290. See, e.g., 3 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 124, §21:10; BERNARD WOLFMAN, ET AL.,
STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE §605.2.1 (6th ed. 2004).
291. See supra text accompanying notes 117-28, and 160-81.
292. Orsini v. Bratten, 713 P.2d 791 (Alaska 1996).
293. Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312 (N.Y. App. Dive. 1990).
294. Eckert Cold Storage, Inc. v. Behl, 943 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. Cal. 1996); Leendertsen v.
Price Waterhouse, 916 P.2d 449 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
295. See discussion of Nebraska and Massachusetts, supratext accompanying notes 247-64.
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jurisdictions continue to follow it based on stare decisis principles, 2 96 it
has gathered no new adherents since then. In addition, it may be
showing early signs of erosion in New York, based on the recent Apple
Bank decision that seems to follow Jamie Towers and the modem
-297
view.
The second reason why I believe the minority view should be
replaced is that it is based on a very weak foundation that appears to be
flawed. The minority view is based on two legs: a logical argument and
some sparse precedent. The basic logical argument of the minority view
is that it is unfair to award interest paid on a tax underpayment as
damages because the plaintiff had use of the money and, presumably,
was able to earn interest on it while holding it. 29 8 This reason (and no
precedent) was articulated first in Orsini2 and was repeated by each of
the other cases adopting this view. 300 Alpert also added the windfall
articulation of this same argument, i.e., that if interest were awarded, a
plaintiff would have a windfall of having had both the use of the money
and the interest recovery as well.3 0 ' Both of these points have been
successfully refuted by the modern view which notes that the underlying
tacit assumption of the minority view is that the value of the use of the
money to the plaintiff is always exactly equal to the interest charged by
the government for the tax underpayment. This is belied, according to
the modern view, by the fact that a plaintiff may not have any available
funds to invest so there are no earnings to offset the interest payment.30 2
Additionally, even if the plaintiff does have funds available, he or she
might not be able to earn as high a rate of return as the interest charged
by the government. Finally, the minority view also ignores the hardship
to a plaintiff who must make an unexpected payment which may not
have been budgeted.30 3
As for the two possible additional reasons for the minority view
suggested by Leendertsen: (1) that "damages from poor investing are
too speculative to blame upon defendants" and that since plaintiffs
decide where to invest, their exercise of this independent judgment
somehow breaks the proximate causation link between the negligence
296. See supra text accompanying notes 207, 209, 212.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 237-44.
298. See supra notes 19-23.
299. Orsini v. Bratten, 713 P.2d 791, 794 (Alaska, 1996).
300. See, e.g., Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 315 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1990); Eckert Cold Storage, Inc., 943 F. Supp. at 1235; Leendertsen, 916 P.2d at 451.
301. Alpert, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 33-37 .
303. See supra text accompanying notes 33-37.
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and the damages; and (2) the difficulty in proving where the money was
invested,3 " they have not been adopted by any other court.305 The
reason for this presumably is the same as the reason articulated by the
Oregon Court of Appeals in McCulloch, when it gave short shrift to
these arguments by noting that these were exactly the types of issues
normally left to the finder of fact to resolve. 3 '
As to the precedent upon which the minority view is based, it is
sparse and distinguishable. Orsini, the first case to articulate the
minority view, did so in only a few lines of text based solely on the use3
of-the-money rationale without citing any precedento.
"
Alpert, the
second case to adopt the minority view cited only two cases, 0 s Freschi
v. Grand Coal Venture3 0 and Cowart v. Lang.310 Freschi involved a
defrauded tax shelter investor seeking recovery under the federal
securities law and for common law fraud.3 1' Freschi, however, based its
entire analysis of the issue of the recoverability of interest on the same
use-of-the-money rationale as Orsini and Alpert.312 It never cited any
other precedent.
When Eckert and Leendertsen adopted the minority
view, apart from the use-of-the-money rationale, they relied only upon
Orsini, Alpert, and two subsequent cases from Alaska and New York
that simply followed Orsini and Alpert,

314

Stone v. Kirk"' and In re

304. Leendertsen, 916 P.2d at 451-52.
305. In Malone v. Clark Nuber, P.S., Case No. C07-2046 RSL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48461
(W.D. Wash. June 23, 2008) the court did follow Leendertsen as establishing Washington's position
on this issue. Id. at *50.
306. McCulloch v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 971 P.2d 414, 414-49 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
307. Orsini v. Bratten, 713 P.2d 791, 794.
308. Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 315 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
309. 767 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1985), vacatedon other grounds,478 U.S. 1015 (1986).
310. 298 N.Y.S. 875 (N.Y. App. Div. 1937).
311. 767 F.2d at 1046. There was also a claim for legal malpractice for which the jury
awarded damages of $440,000. However, the trial judge granted the defendants judgment
notwithstanding the verdict on this claim, id., and this was not an issue on appeal. See also id. at
1051.
312. Id. at 1051.
313. Id.
314. Eckert Cold Storage v. Behl, 943 F. Supp. 1230, 1235 (E.D. Cal. 1996); Leendertsen v.
Price Waterhouse, 916 P.2d 449, 451 (Wash. App. 1996). Eckert cited to Ackerman v. Price
Waterhouse, 591 N.Y.S. 2d 936, 946 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992), afd, 604 N.Y.S.2d 721 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 644 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 1994), which simply cited Alpert for
the proposition that the payment of interest on a tax underpayment is not damages. See 591
N.Y.S.2d. at 946. Leendertsen also cited Gudschinsky v. Hartell, 815 P.2d 851 (Alaska 1991),
which simply followed Orsini. See 815 P.2d at 856.
315. 8 F.3d 1079 (6th Cir. 1993).
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Securities Group 1980.316 Both of these latter cases involved securities
fraud causes of action, and both recognized that Freschiestablished only
that in securities fraud cases and in other fraud cases, interest is not
recoverable.3 1 The reason being that the only damages recoverable in
such situations are either out-of-pocket damages or rescission or
rescissory damages, which permit only a recovery of the plaintiff's net
actual losses. t The following excerpts from Stone v. Kirk illustrate
both the nature and limitations of damages for securities fraud violations
as well as the reversion to the "use of the money rationale" when
holding interest on a tax underpayment is not recoverable:
The correct measure of damages in cases arising under
§10(b)/Rule 1Ob-5 is generally held to be an "out-of-pocket" measure.
... But in some circumstances, at least, it appears that the plaintiff in a
§10(b)/Rule 1Ob-5 case may elect to obtain rescissory damages in lieu
of out-of-pocket damages ....
Out-of-pocket damages, the alternative to rescissory damages, are
not expectancy damages. "The difference between the value of what
[the defrauded investor] got and what it was represented he would be
getting" is not the measure; out-of-pocket damages are limited to "the
excess of what he paid over the value of what he got. . . ." The Stones
are not entitled to recover as damages the taxes they had to pay....
They did not expect to have to pay such taxes, to be sure, but
expectancy damages - damages designed to give the plaintiff the
benefit of his bargain - are simply not recoverable under the federal
securities laws. Neither are the Stones entitled to recover the interest
they had to pay on their back taxes, at least insofar as the IRS charged
a market rate of interest. The Stones had the use of the tax money, of
course, until the money was belatedly turned over to the IRS.m
None of the foregoing federal securities law cases hold interest is
not recoverable as damages in a negligence cause of action.120 Similarly,
Cowart v. Lang was a fraud case in which the measure of damages was
for fraud, not for negligence. 3 2' Thus, in summary, all of the cases
adopting the minority view essentially either directly relied on the useof-the-money rationale, or did so indirectly by relying on Freschi (or
316. 124 B.R. 875 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991), af'd in part, vacated in part, 74 F.3d 1103 (1lth
Cir. 1996).
317. Id. at 902; Stone, 8 F.3d at 1093.
318. In re Securities, 124 B.R. at 902-03; Stone, 8 F.3d at 1092-93.
319. 8 F.3d at 1092-93 (internal citation omitted).
320. See supranotes 223-25.
321. 298 N.Y.S. 875 (N.Y. App. Div. 1937).
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cases that rely on Freschi)or earlier minority view cases which also rely
on the same rationale. Also, all of the non-minority view cases cited as
precedent involve fraud causes of action in which the measure of
damages is very different from the negligence measure of damages. In
fraud situations, the measure of damages is designed to only recover the
net out-of-pocket loss suffered by the plaintiff while in negligence
causes of action expectancy or benefit-of-the-bargain damages are
typically available.322

V. CONCLUSION
Presently, there are three views concerning the recovery of interest
on a tax underpayment caused by a tax advisor's negligence. The
traditional view, which is still the majority view, permits the recovery of
such interest. A minority view, which absolutely prohibits the recovery
of such interest. The modern, intermediate view, which permits the
recovery of such interest, but only when the interest paid the government
exceeds the earnings the plaintiff was able to realize from the use of the
underpaid taxes. There are two approaches utilized by the modern view
to achieve its goal. Some adherents of the modern view impose the
burden of proof on the plaintiff to show the earnings on the tax
underpayment were less than the interest paid the government. Other
adherents permit a recovery of the full interest paid the government,
subject to reduction if the defendant is able to prove the plaintiff
received some special benefit i.e., earnings, on the tax underpayment.
The development of the three views seems to be a good example of
how the common law evolves. First came the traditional view that
simply applied traditional common law conceptions of damages
recoverable on account of negligence to the recovery of such interest
damages. Because the interest would not have been incurred but for the
defendant's negligence, the interest charges were recoverable according
to traditional principles.323 The minority view sensed the injustice of the
traditional view because it overcompensated plaintiffs. Plaintiffs,
although incurring the interest cost to the government, did have the use
of the money, so, according to the minority view, the interest payment

322. With respect to fraud, see Stone, 8 F.3d at 1092-93, discussed in the text accompanying
supra note 319; Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc., 668 N.E.2d 1370, 1373-77 (N.Y. 1996).
See generally 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 9.2(l) (2d ed. 1993). With respect to
negligence, see Flynn v. Judge, 133 N.Y.S. 794, 796-97 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912); 3 MALLEN &
SMITH, supra note 124, § 21.1 at p.3, § 21.4 at p. 15.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 143-44.
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did not really represent any loss or damages to plaintiffs. 324 The
minority view adopted an approach exactly opposite the traditional view,
and absolutely refused to treat such interest as recoverable damages. In
response to the traditional and minority views, modem cases analyzed
the underlying factual situation more carefully and realized that both
extreme views had the potential for injustice-to either overcompensate
(i.e., the traditional view) or undercompensate (i.e., the minority view)
plaintiffs-so they adopted a much more precise manner of treating such
interest payments by awarding or not awarding interest as damages
depending on the actual earnings generated by this particular plaintiff
with the underpaid tax funds.325
Today, the modem view seems most just since it is very precise in
awarding damages, thereby avoiding the problems inherent in the other
views. While, ideally, each of the other views ought to be changed and
the modem view adopted, the traditional view could accomplish this
same result without necessarily changing its jurisprudence. This could
be accomplished in one of two ways. First, the traditional view could
simply refine its definition of such interest damages by looking to net
interest damages incurred by a plaintiff, i.e., by reducing the gross
interest paid to the government by the earnings realized by the plaintiff
on the use of the underpaid taxes, and only awarding the net amount as
damages. The second way would be for the traditional view to treat any
interest earned 32 6 by the plaintiff as mitigating the defendant's damages,
thus arriving at the same net interest award as actually suffered by each
particular plaintiff. This latter approach may in fact be what the
327
McCulloch case did right before the birth of the modern view.
Unfortunately, the minority view has no similar means to adapt,
and it should be abrogated and replaced by one of the branches of the
modern view.328 Ultimately, the minority view rests its position on the

324. See supra notes 19-23.
325. See supra notes 33-35 and 51-67
326. An argument could be made that not only the actual earnings realized by a plaintiff from
the tax underpayment should be taken into account, but also potential earnings. For instance, if a
plaintiff takes a tax underpayment and places it in a non-interest bearing checking account rather
than in an interest hearing account for no apparent reason, perhaps the potential earnings should also
reduce or mitigate any recoverable interest. Calculating such potential earnings, however, may
present difficult issues.
327. See supratext accompanying notes 117-25, and 164-78.
328. The branch of the modern view that seems closest to the minority view is the one that
places the burden of proving the existence of an interest differential on the plaintiff. This view
seems to start from the proposition that generally interest paid a government is not damages because
the plaintiff had use of the funds. If a plaintiff seeks to assert there were damages, the burden of
proof is on the plaintiff.
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logical argument that such interest paid to a government is not damages
because the plaintiff had the offsetting use of the funds. 32 9 However, the
modem view has effectively countered this argument by noting that the
minority's argument only works where the interest earned by a plaintiff
on the use of the funds exactly equals the interest charged by the
This precise equality may occur only very rarely.
government.
Similarly, the few cases cited by the minority view as authority are
either other cases that previously adopted the minority view, cases from
minority view states that simply follow the minority view under
principles of stare decisis, or federal securities law cases that either
directly or indirectly rely upon the same use-of-the-money rationale.33 o
Also, almost all cases cited as support for the minority view (other than
cases that previously adopted the minority view or simply followed it as
stare decisis) are either federal securities fraud cases and one civil fraud
case in which, the measure of damages is very different from the
traditional negligence measure of damages. The measure of damages in
these situations is simply rescission or rescissory damages which seek to
make good any out-of-pocket losses suffered by the plaintiff. The
measure of damages for negligence is broader and includes
compensation for expectancy or benefit of the bargain. 3
The final evidence that the minority view has outlived its
usefulness and ought to be replaced by the modern view is that today it
is still followed in only the same four states in which it was initially
adopted between 1986 and 1996. Although it may have gained
temporary adherents in two other states-Nebraska and Massachusettsit has not developed any following at all.332 Contrariwise, the modern
view is now followed in seven states and the federal district court in
Oregon.
Since the birth of the modem view between 1999 and 2000 in
Ronson and Streber all jurisdictions outside the four minority-view
states that have examined the issue have adopted one of the two
branches of the modern view.33 4 Also, in New York, the jurisdiction

329. The second rationale often given for the minority view---that if interest were awarded as
damages a plaintiff would have a windfall of having both the use of the money and recovering the
interest thereon-is really the same as the use-of-the-money reason. See Alpert v. Shea Gould
Climenko & Casey, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 315 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
330. See generally, supra Part IV.
331. See generally,supra Part IV.
332. See generally,supra Part II.
333. See generally,supra Part i.
334. See supranote 289.
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with the most relevant cases, it may be that cracks are beginning to
appear in its adherence to the minority view.33 s
With due respect to William Shakespeare, it seems that now is the
time both to praise the minority view-for changing continued blind
adherence to the traditional approach of simply treating such interest as
damages-and then to bury it in favor of the modem, more temperate,
and more just, view.

335. See supra text accompanying notes 211-44.
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IN MEMORIAM

Brent B. Nicholson

Professor Brent B. Nicholson, renowned and beloved professor at
Bowling Green State University passed away on December 4, 2010, at
age 56.
Professor Nicholson, an attorney and Certified Public
Accountant by training, brought a breadth and depth of practical
experience to the classroom and his scholarly endeavors. He began
teaching at Bowling Green State University, his Alma Mater, in 1989.
His tenure was marked by tremendous professional innovations and
achievements and colored by his love of and commitment to his
students. He will be missed and remembered by his family, friends,
colleagues, students, and all others whom he touched during his full and
rich life.
From all of my interactions with Professor Nicholson, I could
easily discern that he was not only an extremely knowledgeable and
passionate scholar, but a truly warm and amiable human being. It was
my distinct pleasure to have worked with him to prepare this article for
publication. All of those that he leaves behind to mourn his passing and
cherish his memory should take pride in the fact that Professor
Nicholson leaves more than just memories behind, but an enduring and
diverse body of work that was his passion. The staff and faculty
advisors of the Akron Tax Journalare proud and honored to publish one
of the final pieces of Professor Nicholson's work in this volume.
Matthew E. Williams
Managing Editor
Akron Tax Journal
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